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Counterfactuals : The Epistemic Analysis1
John-Michael Kuczynski
University of California, Santa Barbara
Résumé : En temps normal, les contrefactuels sont conçus comme produi-
sant des énoncés portant sur des états de choses, mais des états de choses se
trouvant dans des mondes simplement possibles ou alternes. Analysés ainsi, il
s’avère que presque tous les contrefactuels sont incohérents. Tout contrefac-
tuel analysé de la sorte exige qu’il y ait un monde métaphysiquement (et pas
épistémiquement seulement) possible w où les lois sont les mêmes qu’ici, et où
la quasi-totalité des faits sont les mêmes qu’ici. (Les différences factuelles sont
liées à l’antécédent et au conséquent du contrefactuel). Mais comme je vais le
montrer, cette exigence implique de manière typique la postulation de mondes
dont on peut démontrer la nécessaire non-existence au moyen de déductions
assez élémentaires. De plus, l’analyse des contrefactuels en termes de mondes
possibles est coupable de circularité cachée. Analysés ainsi, les contrefactuels
ne peuvent effectivement être compris qu’en termes de lois de la nature (les lois
qui s’appliquent ici sont présupposées dans le monde hypothétique — excepté
dans le cas atypique où le contrefactuel est également un contre-nomique).
Mais il y a un argument répandu voulant que le concept de loi ne puisse pas
être défini lui-même, sinon dans les termes de la notion de contrefactuel (une
loi est, entre autres, quelque chose qui vient à l’appui des contrefactuels). Je
donnerai une analyse purement épistémique des contrefactuels, déclarant que
ce sont des propositions pseudo-probabilistes. Je déclarerai également que le
type de probabilité en question peut être défini intégralement en termes de ce
qui a été le cas (non pas de ce qui aurait été le cas, ni même de ce qui doit
être le cas en un sens nomique.) Mon analyse n’est donc coupable d’aucune
sorte de circularité.
1This paper benefited immeasurably from the incisive points made by an anony-
mous reviewer at Philosophia Scientiae. Nearly all of the points attributed to the
imaginary interlocutor are points made by the reviewer. I would also like to thank
Ernan McMullen for reading an earlier draft.
Philosophia Scientiæ, 9 (1), 2005, 83–126.
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Abstract: Ordinarily counterfactuals are seen as making statements about
states of affairs, albeit ones that hold in merely possible or alternative worlds.
Thus analyzed, nearly all counterfactuals turn out to be incoherent. Any
counterfactual, thus analyzed, requires that there be a metaphysically (not
just epistemically) possible world w where the laws are the same as here, and
where almost all of the facts are the same as here. (The factual differences
relate to the antecedent and consequent of the counter-factual.) But, as I
show, this requirement typically involves the positing of worlds whose neces-
sary non-existence can be shown by fairly elementary deductions. Further,
the possible-worlds analysis of counterfactuals is guilty of covert circularity.
For, thus analyzed, counterfactuals can only be understood in terms of laws
of nature (the laws that apply here are assumed in the hypothetical world -
except in the atypical case where the counterfactual is also a counter-nomic).
But there is widespread agreement that the concept of a law cannot itself be
defined except in terms of the notion of a counterfactual (a law is inter alia
something that supports counterfactuals). I give a purely epistemic analysis of
counterfactuals, arguing that they are crypto-probability propositions. I also
argue that the relevant kind of probability can be defined wholly in terms of
what has happened (not what would happen and not even what must happen
in a nomic sense). So my analysis isn’t guilty of any kind of circularity.
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I. Statements like the following are examples of counterfactuals :
(1) If Kennedy had not been assassinated, the U.S. would have pulled
out of Viet Nam before 1965.
(2) If Jones had not fired the gun, Smith would still be alive today.
A counterfactual says what would have been the case if some condi-
tion C obtained, when in fact C did not obtain.
The consensus is that no acceptable analysis of counterfactuals has
been proposed. I agree with the consensus. The reason there is no satis-
factory analysis is that the existing analyses regard counterfactuals as
saying something about causal relations among states of affairs — al-
beit ones that take place in non-actual or actual but alternative worlds.
The right approach, I argue, is to see counterfactuals as expressing re-
lations of probabilification holding among statements. Counterfactuals
don’t really say anything about events or anything concrete — or even
anything that would be concrete if it existed. Counterfactuals merely
register confirmation relations among propositions. That is what I will
try to show in this paper.
I must make one thing clear. I am taking it for granted that counter-
factuals are, or can be, true. I am not arguing that they are necessarily
incoherent or otherwise false. So given that a factualist analysis makes
them incoherent, a non-factualist analysis — an epistemic one — is nee-
ded.
Of course, it has been argued (by Quine, for example in [Quine 1982,
23]) that counterfactuals are meaningless or, at least, systematically
false. But given how endemic they are to our thought, it would be better
to find a way to make them non-meaningless than to try to do without
them2. (I am open to the idea that they are all meaningless or false, but I
will try to show how we can avoid coming to that undesirable conclusion.)
II. David Lewis has given the most perspicuous account of the conceit
that underlies ordinary thinking about counterfactuals, and that under-
lies virtually all philosophical thinking about it :
“If kangaroos had no tails, they would topple over” seems
to me to mean something like this : in any possible state of
2Clarence Lewis [Lewis 1929] argued compellingly that every statement about the
physical world — even those that seem to have no counter-factual component — are
in fact implicitly counterfactual. When you say that something is steel, you are saying
something about how it would behave if it were subjected to certain conditions. I am
inclined to agree with Lewis. There is no way to purge our discourse of counter-factual
elements. So we have to find a way to make counterfactuals work.
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affairs in which kangaroos have no tails, and which resembles
our actual state of affairs as much as having no tails permits
it to, the kangaroos topple over (See [Lewis 1973, 1].
Notice that Lewis construes counterfactuals as making statements
about states of affairs, albeit ones that hold in worlds other than this
one. What makes (2) true is (inter alia) that, in some other world, Jones
doesn’t fire the gun and Smith still remains alive.
If Lewis is right, what (2) does not do is make a statement about
logical relations among propositions. (2) is about facts following facts,
bodies hitting (or not hitting) other bodies. If Lewis is right, (2) isn’t
about a shadow world of logical interrelations holding among platonic
entities.
Let us describe as factualist any analysis that is, in this respect,
like Lewis’. The factualist says that counterfactuals are about states of
affairs, facts, and objects — the things we encounter in this world —
except that they are in alternative worlds.
The factualist view is not tenable. That is what I will show. Coun-
terfactuals do not say anything about relations among events, not even
events that are in worlds other than this one. Counterfactuals say so-
mething only about the degree of credibility that certain propositions
confer on other propositions.
III. Suppose that, in actual fact, Smith shoots Jones and thereby
kills him. Given this, Let us consider the proposition :
(2) If Jones had not fired the gun, Smith would still be alive today.
This is a perfectly good counterfactual : the kind that might well be
true. Let us apply the factualist analysis to it. According to the factualist,
the meaning of (2) is :
(3) Consider a world w with the following two properties. First, in
w, Jones doesn’t pull the trigger. Second, with that qualification, w is
as much like our world as it could be. In w, Smith is still alive.
One point must be made explicit. The laws obtaining in w must be
the same as the laws that govern our universe. For if the physical laws
of w are different from those in our world, then the counterfactual is
immediately voided. If those laws are different, then Jones’ pulling the
trigger might not lead to the bullet leaving the gun, or Smith’s flesh
might repulse the bullet, or there might not even be a gun — perhaps
those other laws wouldn’t permit atoms to bind to one another in the
right way. So clearly w must be governed by the same laws as our world.
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Given this, let L1 . . . Ln be the laws that govern our world. As we
just saw, L1 . . . Ln must also govern w. Now in our world, C1 . . . Ck led
to Jones’ pulling the trigger. Of course, C1 . . . Ck led to that event be-
cause laws L1 . . . Ln govern our world. (A different set of laws needn’t
lead from those initial conditions to that particular conclusion.) Trivially,
laws are either deterministic or they’re not. A “deterministic” law is gi-
ven by a proposition of the form : Given such and such conditions, thus
and such happens 100% of the time. An “indeterministic” law is given
by a proposition of the form : given such and such conditions, thus and
such happens a certain percentage of the time (not 100%). Let us first
investigate the consequences of supposing that L1 . . . Ln are determinis-
tic. Then we will consider the consequences of supposing that at least
some of the laws in L1 . . . Ln are indeterministic. (This exhausts all the
possibilities : either all of L1 . . . Ln are deterministic, or some of them
are not deterministic, i.e. are indeterministic.)
IV. First case : suppose L1 . . . Ln are deterministic. In that case, in
w, C1 . . . Ck lead to Jones pulling the trigger. Now remember that we are
trying to keep things in w as much like things in our world as is possible
given that, in w, Jones did not pull the trigger. We’ve just seen that we
cannot keep C1 . . . Ck the same ; at least one of them must go. So, for
some i, Ci must not be the case in w. But Ci did not just come out of
nowhere ; some previous set of conditions C∗1 . . . C
∗
m are what led to Ci.
So given that Ci is not the case in w, and given that the laws leading
from C∗1 . . . C
∗
m to Ci are deterministic, we must suppose that, for some
j, C∗j is not the case. Otherwise we are stuck with Ci, and if we are
stuck with Ci, we are stuck with Jones’ pulling the trigger. Of course,
C∗j didn’t just come out of nowhere ; it arose from some prior conditions
C∗∗1 . . . C
∗∗
o . So we must assume, for now familiar reasons, that for some
k, C∗∗k is not the case. Clearly this regress goes on and on.
In fact, this regress goes back into the furthest recesses of the past.
So it is clear that, if Jones is to not pull the trigger in w, then w’s past
must be very different from the past of our world. But if w’s past is that
different, then there is no guarantee at all that w’s present would even
remotely resemble our present. What we want is for w’s present to be
just like ours except that Jones doesn’t pull the trigger. But what we get
is a present which almost certainly doesn’t even have a Jones or a Smith
and which, even if it does comprise Smith and Jones, is so different from
our world that nothing can be said with confidence about it.
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In a deterministic world, any event is deeply embedded in other
events. Consequently, two deterministic worlds cannot differ with res-
pect to a single event unless they differ with respect to countless other
events. Given that Jones didn’t actually shoot Smith, a world that is
different enough from ours to have Jones shooting Smith will, paradoxi-
cally, be too different to include that event. And even if (what is virtually
impossible) Jones does shoot Smith in w, the conditions that surround
that shooting will probably be so different that, for all we know, Smith
does survive. If the conditions in w are different enough to allow Jones
to shoot Smith, then they may be different enough to allow Jones to be
wearing a bullet-proof vest.
So if the factualist approach is to work, then our world must be in-
deterministic. Let us now consider this option.
V. Second case : suppose some laws are indeterministic. Once again,
let L1 . . . Ln be the laws governing our world. And suppose that, for
some i, Li is indeterministic.
First of all, counterfactuals are only as good as our laws are deter-
ministic. Suppose that being shot in the chest is fatal 100% of the time.
In other words, suppose the law : x is shot in the chest→ x dies is de-
terministic. In that case, I can say with complete certainty “if Jones had
been shot in the chest, he would have died”.
But if that law is only probabilistic, then the counterfactual is not
true. If being shot in the chest leads to death 39% of the time, or even
72% of the time, then the counterfactual “if x had been shot in the chest,
x would have died” is definitely not true. It seems to lack truth-value.
What can truly be said is “if x had been shot in the chest, then there
would have been a 39% (or 72%) of x’s dying.” But that is an entirely
different statement from the original counterfactual.
Of course, given only that some laws are indeterministic, it doesn’t
follow that all counterfactuals are thereby vitiated : only those counter-
factuals are vitiated which depend on the probabilistic laws in question.
Given this, it might seem that if some, but not all, laws are indeter-
ministic, then the factualist position might work.
But it is easy to show that the existence of some indeterministic laws
doesn’t help the factualist at all. It makes things worse for him.
To help put the reasons for this in context, let us momentarily forget
that we are talking about indeterministic laws and let us once again talk
about deterministic laws. Let us once again suppose that L1 . . . Ln (the
laws that govern our universe) are deterministic. It is, at the very least,
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an epistemic possibility that this supposition should turn out to be true.
Taking ‘might’ in a purely epistemic sense, future science might reveal
that all our laws are deterministic.
If this should turn out to be the case, it would obviously not mean
that all our counterfactuals statements would turn out to be false. Consi-
der the following counterfactual :
(4) If Brown had struck the window with the hammer, it would have
broken.
Let us suppose that the window is very thin, that Brown is strong,
and so on. In other words, let us suppose that (4) is a true counterfactual.
If future physicists discover that quantum mechanics is deterministic,
would it mean that (4) turns out to be false ? Suppose that in the year
2135 it is finally established that all physical laws are deterministic. Will
people then say : "I guess we were wrong to say that if President Clinton
had resigned, Gore would have become President" ? Of course not. Those
counterfactuals would still be true.
An analysis of counterfactuals cannot make the truth of such state-
ments depend on things on which their truth is not in fact dependent.
It is a datum that (4) is true. It is not a datum (though it may be true)
that
(5) there are indeterministic laws.
So the truth of (4) does not depend on that of (5). But the factualist’s
analysis makes the truth of (4) depend on that of (5). So the factualist’s
analysis is wrong.
The specificity of the factualist’s demands
There is more to say. If indeterminism is to make the factualist ana-
lysis work, it is not enough that world be indeterministic in any way. On
the contrary, it must be indeterministic in extremely specific ways. The
factualist needs the indeterminism to be operative in specific contexts,
and in specific ways within those contexts. At the same time, the fac-
tualist needs other contexts to be resolutely deterministic.
Consider the laws mediating between window-strikings and window-
shatterings. If those laws are indeterministic, then (4) comes out false.
The indeterministic character of the laws involved might allow the win-
dow to stay intact. So if (4) is to come out true, then those laws must
be resolutely deterministic.
At the same time, the factualist needs indeterminism to prevail in
other contexts. This is a consequence of what we said earlier. The fac-
tualist says that the occurrences in some world w are what make (4)
true. w must be governed by the same laws as our world. If our world is
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too deterministic, then a single difference between our world and w will
mean a massive difference between them. And, as we saw earlier, if there
is such a massive difference, then the occurrences in w will not make (4)
be true.
So the factualist-indeterminist (i.e. somebody who is a factualist but
predicates the truth of counterfactuals on the existence of indeterministic
laws) ends up being committed to extremely specific beliefs as to where
indeterministic laws are operative. He needs the world to be deterministic
in very specific ways, and he also needs the world to be indeterministic
in very specific ways. It is at best an open empirical matter whether the
world has just the right balance of determinism and indeterminism. (At
worst, what the factualist wants is totally incoherent. I will discuss this
in a moment.)
So if the factualist is right, then counter-factuals like (4) would turn
out to be false if scientists discovered, as they well may, that the world
doesn’t have the right balance of determinism and indeterminism. But
surely the truth of (4) is not contingent on the outcome of such inquiries.
So the factualist has mis-analyzed (4).
But even this is too charitable to the factualist. On the factualist ac-
count, different mixtures of determinism and indeterminism are needed
to validate different counter-factuals. The mixture of determinism and
indeterminism needed to validate the factualist analysis of “if Jones had
struck the window, the window would have shattered” is going to be dif-
ferent from the mixture needed to validate “if Jones hadn’t taken his pills
this morning, he would now very ill”. Given that Jones did take his pills,
certain laws must be indeterministic in a world w where Jones did not
take his pills, but is otherwise like our world. Given that Jones did not
strike the window, certain laws must be suspended in a world w∗ where
Jones did strike the window, but is otherwise like our world. But the
set of laws that are indeterministic in w will inevitably not quite coin-
cide with the set of laws that are indeterministic in w∗. Both w and w∗
must be governed by the same laws as our world ; otherwise occurrences
in those worlds don’t validate counter-factuals affirmed here. It follows
that in our world, certain laws must be simultaneously deterministic and
indeterministic. But this is absurd.
The factualist needs the world to be simultaneously characterized
by different mixtures of determinism and indeterminism. But this is an
incoherent requirement.
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An objection
I will end this section by addressing a possible objection (objections
to my analysis will henceforth be put in the words of an imaginary
interlocutor) :
The argument you just gave seems to involve the premise
that the macroscopic world is “vanishingly close” to being
deterministic. Admittedly, there is a fair amount of empiri-
cal support for this view, and it is a standard one. But it
might turn out to be wrong. In that case, it seems, your ar-
gument would fail. So your argument presupposes the truth
of a dubious empirical doctrine3.
For the sake of argument, let’s suppose I am wrong. Let’s suppose
that the macroscopic world is non-negligibly indeterministic. In that
case, the factualist’s position is automatically nullified. Suppose that,
in our world, the exact same initial conditions, down to the last proton,
lead to the car starting only 54% of the time. (Suppose that my turning
the key in the ignition is, or eventuates in, one these initial conditions.)
In light of this, consider the counter-factual :
(6) If I’d turned the key, the car would have started
What does the factualist say about (6) ? He says :
Let w be a world just like ours with this one difference : in w,
you did turn the key. With that qualification w is as much
like our world as is possible. In w, the car does start.
But that isn’t good reasoning at all. w must be governed by the same
laws as here. So the same indeterminism that infects our macro-world
must infect w’s macro-world. Given this, it is obviously quite false to say
that, in w, the car definitely does start. The most one can say is : there
is a 54% chance that it starts in w. Really, the proposition in w, under
the circumstances described, the car starts seems to lack truth-value. In
any case, it definitely isn’t true. So in so far as the macro-world here is
indeterministic, then the factualist position is quite definitely false.
Summary
The factualist needs there to be worlds that are almost exactly like
our worlds. For every proposition P that is not true of our world, the
factualist needs there to be a world w with the following property : in
w, P is true ; but apart from that, there are no significant differences
between our world and w.
3This point was made to me by an anonymous reviewer at Philosophia Scientiae.
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But either this demand cannot be met or, if it can be met, the condi-
tions that enable it to be met make w incapable of validating the counter-
factuals it is supposed to validate.
On the factualist account, when we run a counter-factual, we are
considering a world w where the laws are the same as they are in our
world.
Either our world is deterministic or it is not. Let us consider each
option. First let us suppose our world is deterministic.
Two deterministic worlds cannot differ from each other with respect
to a single state of affairs unless they differ with respect to a series of
states of affairs extending back into the furthest recesses of time. Of
course, if the pasts of two worlds differ that much, then their presents
will differ in unfathomable ways.
So if Jones shot Smith in w, and Jones didn’t shoot Smith in this
world, then this world and w will differ in unfathomable ways. We thus
have absolutely no idea what the consequences of Jones’ shooting Smith
in w might be. In fact, the chances of there even being a Jones or a Smith
in w are infinitesimal. So the occurrences in w are useless when it comes
to validating counter-factuals.
So if our world is deterministic, then the factualist approach is a
failure. So let us suppose that our world is indeterministic.
This supposition destroys the factualist’s position. Counter-factuals
are sustainable only in so far as the world is deterministic. So to the
extent that counter-factuals can be truly affirmed, the world is determi-
nistic. But then we run into the problem just described.
So the factualist analysis fails if the world is deterministic, and it
fails if the world is not deterministic. So it fails.
VI. But we have not yet completely refuted the factualist’s position.
For there is one move that the factualist might still make4 :
Suppose that in actuality, Jones does not shoot Smith. And
suppose that Jones is psychologically normal and thus would
feel remorse if he did something as heinous as shooting so-
mebody.
Given this, consider the counter-factual :
(7) If Jones had shot Smith, Jones would now be feeling pro-
found remorse.
4Lewis in [Lewis 1973] makes this move.
Counterfactuals: The Epistemic Analysis 93
Let w be some world that is just like ours except for this
one thing. In w, at time t, Jones shoots Smith. In the actual
world, at time t, Jones does not shoot Smith.
I grant that the factualist runs into the problem you des-
cribed if he insists on tracing every difference between w
and our world to some pre-existing difference between them.
For then, obviously, he will have to suppose that w’s entire
history deviates from ours.
But there is no reason why the factualist must do that. The
factualist can say this. Suppose that up until t w and the
actual world are exactly the same. But at t, the two worlds
diverge. In w, Jones shoots Smith. In our world, Jones does
not Smith.
Of course, if w is to diverge from the actual world in this way,
then some miracle must occur in w. For given the laws and
initial conditions that obtain in our world, Jones must shoot
Smith at t. Thus, Jones must shoot Smith at t in w as well.
But this ’must’ can be neutralized by a miracle. (There are
metaphysically possible worlds where miracles happen.) And
this is just what happens in w at t. Thus w differs from the
actual world in just the one respect the factualist requires.
Consequently w can validate the counter-factual in question
in just the right way.
The literature on counter-factuals is replete with moves like the one
just described. But that move fails on multiple levels. It involves profound
but easily demonstrated misunderstandings concerning both the nature
of persistence throughout time and also concerning the nature of natural
law.
According to the factualist, our world is just like w until t : same
laws, same conditions. But, in w, some miracle happens at t. That is
why, in w, Jones manages to shoot Smith.
The first thing to point out is that it is not just one miracle that
happens. It is billions upon billions. Shooting somebody is not a simple
event. Various psychological, metabolic, cellular, molecular, atomic, and
sub-atomic events are involved. Your pulling a trigger involves innume-
rable bio-chemical and, therefore, atomic events. The miracle in question
involves each of those atoms and protons and quarks occupying a place
that, nomically, it is not supposed to occupy. Countless particles must
suddenly be re-directed or, failing that, be annihilated. This would in-
volve suspending many, perhaps all, of the laws involved the behavior of
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those particles. So each atom-relocation involves a miracle. In fact, each
such relocation involves several miracles. For more than one physical law
will have to be suspended in each case.
Let Alpha be any one of the particles composing Jones, and let t be
the time of the miracle. The miracle in question involves severing many,
probably all, of the causal ties that link Alpha–before–t to Alpha–after–t.
Now we can begin to see the incoherence in what the factualist is
demanding. Objects just are causal sequences. They are series of states
of affairs that are linked together by physical laws. If x and y have no
causal connections to each other — if they are not installments in the
same causal process — then x and y are not the same object.
The factualist wants us to suspend the laws that link Alpha–before–t
to Alpha-after-t. So he wants us to sever the causal connections between
the former and the latter. If he severs all such connections, then Alpha-
before-t and Alpha–after–t are simply different entities. The factualist
has simply annihilated a certain particle, not redirected it.
The laws that govern the behavior of an entity are required for its
continued existence. Causal ties do not bind an object ; they compose it.
If you sever them, the object isn’t liberated. It ceases to exist.
The factualist needs to sever the ties that bind Jones-before-t to
Jones-after-t. But if he does this, then he has simply annihilated Jones,
not redirected him. So if we grant the factualist his miracle, then there
is no Jones after t. A fortiori there is no Jones who feels remorse.
Of course, the factualist could argue that the miracle in question
doesn’t sever all of the ties that are involved in Jones’ continued exis-
tence. Some of those ties — the ones needed to sustain Jones’ existence
— are left unsevered. But other ties — the ones that, in our world, lead
Jones to do something other than shoot Smith — are severed.
But it is exceedingly unlikely that such a neat separation can be
effected between those two sets of causal ties. If we are going to redirect
all of those atoms, molecules, cells, and so on, then we must put all
manner of physical laws out of commission. The laws of electrodynamics,
mechanics, thermodynamics, and so on, must all be suspended. But if
all of these laws are suspended, what is left over that can keep Jones in
existence ? Jones is a causal process. In all likelihood, every law of physics
will have to be suspended to create the miracle that the factualist wants.
Remember the factualist is asking for billions of miracles ; he is asking
billions of particles to not do what, as a matter of physical law, they
must do. Leaving aside highly derivative laws like pinewood floats on
water, it is exceedingly unlikely that any law of physics will escape the
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factualist’s wrath.
The needed cut in causal ties is so deep that what is left over, if
anything, will almost certainly not be enough to sustain Jones’ existence.
As for the chances of Jones’ continuing to exist in good enough physical
and psychological health to feel remorse — those chances are essentially
zero.
The non-containability of miracles
There is another reason to hold that miracles do not help the factua-
list, indeed, that they have no place in discussion of counter-factuals.
A miracle is a suspension of a natural law. But it isn’t possible to
contain or isolate suspensions of causal laws. So if we help ourselves to a
miracle, then we are committed to all manner of consequences that are
not even counter-factually true.
Suppose we don’t want some event E1 to occur in our counterfactual
scenario ; and we keep E1 out by suspending some set of laws L1 . . . Ln
What ends up happening is that, because of that suspension, various
other events E2 . . . Ek that we don’t want to happen end up happening.
So in suspending L1 . . . Ln, we end up committing ourselves to counter-
factuals that are not true or that, in any case, are very different from
the one we want to assert.
Once again, consider (7). The laws and initial conditions that pre-
vailed in our world required Jones not to shoot Smith. Those same laws
and conditions obtain in w. So if Jones is to shoot Smith in w, there
must be a miracle : the laws binding Jones to not shooting Smith must
be suspended. But if those laws are put out of operation, even for a mo-
ment, the result is completely and utterly unpredictable. It is as likely
that Jones turns to gelatin as it is that he feels remorse.
This becomes apparent when we start to think more rigorously about
the nature of causation. We say that the cause of the crash was Brown’s
inattention to the road. But the truth is that innumerable conditions had
to obtain for Brown to crash. The road and the tires had to be made
of a certain material ; the tread on the tires had to be worn down by a
certain amount ; the road had to be wet ; the car had to be moving with
a certain speed ; the mechanisms connecting the steering wheel to the
rotations of the tires had to have, or lack, a certain degree of integrity ;
and on and on5. Given virtually any event, the conditions that were
causally necessary for that event to occur are innumerable6.
5This example was borrowed from Carnap, who makes this very point.
6Indeed, an old debate in the philosophy of science — one that has still not been
settled (but is no longer focused on) — is the question whether causal relations hold
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The other side of the coin is that, if some set of conditions C1 . . . Cm is
sufficient to bring about a given event, then it is also sufficient to bring
about innumerable other events. Nothing that causes anything causes
just one thing.
Given this, suppose that, in w, L1 . . . Ln are suspended, so that
C1 . . . Cm don’t lead to Jones’ pulling the trigger. That suspension will
not just lead to Jones’ not pulling the trigger ; it will have innumerable
other consequences. It is overwhelmingly likely that what was necessary
to get Jones to pull the trigger was also necessary for Jones’ head not
to explode, for the house he was in not to disintegrate, for the electrical
activity in Jones’ brain not to cease. Among the necessary conditions
of Jones’ pulling the trigger — in other words, among C1 . . . Cm — are
facts having to do with the integrity of the various alloys composing the
gun ; facts relating to the architecture of the house Jones was in ; facts
relating to the durability of the materials composing the floor Jones’
was standing on ; facts relating to the amount of pressure that Jones’
vertebrae could withstand without pulverizing ; and so on. If we suspend
L1 . . . Ln just enough to make sure that Jones does not pull the trig-
ger, then we are suspending them quite enough to vaporize Jones’ spinal
cord, to melt Smith’s brain, to turn the house that they are both occu-
pying into a heap of smoldering rubble. So if we analyze (7) as making
a statement about some world where there is a miracle, then we cannot
hold (7) without also holding some absurd proposition like :
(8) If Jones hadn’t pulled the trigger, then the house Smith and Jones
are occupying would have turned to dust
For if we suspend the laws in w enough to get Jones to shoot Smith,
we will be suspending them enough to make all manner of other, unwan-
ted things happen.
The factualist needs to use miracles. But miracles turn counter-
factuals into counter-nomics. So the factualist turns counter-factuals into
statements about occurrences in worlds that are not, strictly speaking,
governed by the same laws as ours. Given two worlds that differ in res-
pect of their laws, even in the most minor way, the differences between
them are incalculable. A counter-nomic scenario will differ so much from
the actual world that it couldn’t possibly validate any counter-factuals,
at least not without simultaneously validating many false ones.
between the state of the entire universe at one time and the state of the entire universe
at a later time. See the last chapter of Russell’s Principles of Mathematics. If causal
relations hold between states of the universe at different times — and it is still an
open question whether they do — then the factualist position is immediately seen to
be untenable.
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The incoherence of the concept of a miracle
So far we have allowed that miracles are in some sense possible. Phi-
losophers writing about counter-factuals make practically unrestricted
use of miracles. So do ordinary people in their day to day thinking. It is
generally taken for granted that miracles are in some sense possible.
But the concept of a miracle is one that has no utility at all for the
factualist. The very concept of a miracle is incoherent unless a quite
specific, and highly controversial, conception of natural law is the right
one. But if that conception of law is the right one, then the correct
analysis of counter-factuals is absolutely not the factualist one.
Ultimately, there are two ways of thinking about laws. On the one
hand, laws can be thought of as mere regularities. This is how Hume
thought about them. On the other hand, they can be thought of as
things that ground regularities — as things that guarantee that, when
such and such happens, thus and such will also happen.
Let us consider each of these conceptions, and see what the conse-
quences are for the factualist.
Non-Humean miracles
First, suppose that Hume is wrong about laws ; let us suppose that
laws ground regularities, and are not identical with them. In that case,
as a matter of conceptual necessity, laws are not the kinds of things that
can be suspended.
Imagine the following. Some state of affairs a causes some other state
of affairs b. The relevant covering law is : If there is an A at t, then there
is a B at t∗.
Given that a really is the cause of b, it follows trivially that a by itself
guarantees b’s existence. It isn’t as though something must be added to a
to make b happen. If some such addition had to be made, then contrary
to our supposition, a would not be the cause of b. It would, at most, be
a partial cause.
This means that merely by virtue of the fact that we have a, we have
enough for b. In other words, given only that we have an instance of type
A, we have enough for an instance of type B.
This, in turn, means that if the antecedent of some law is fulfilled,
then ipso facto that law is instantiated and is operative. If we have an
A, then ipso facto the law that generates a B is instantiated.
The only way you can have an A without having a B is if A is not by
itself sufficient for B. But if A were thus deficient, it wouldn’t cause B
at all. It would be, at most, a partial cause.
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Law are not things added to states of affairs. They are internal to
the states of affairs they govern. You cannot remove the laws without
removing the states of affairs themselves. Such a removal cannot even be
thought, at least not coherently. Of course, such removals are thought.
But those thoughts involve the absurd idea that something must be
added to a causally sufficient condition to make it be a causally sufficient
condition.
So if we think of laws as things that tie events together, and not just
as regularities, then laws can no more be suspended or removed than
triangles can have four sides.
Humean miracles
So if the factualist is to have his miracles, then he must not think of
laws as things that tie events together. So he must be a Humean about
laws ; he must see laws as mere regularities.
But if laws are Humean, then the possible-worlds approach to counter-
factuals is completely bankrupt.
The Humean says that laws are just regularities. For A’s to cause
B’s is just for B’s to always come right after A’s. There is no inner
connection ; nothing grounds the regularity. The regularity is all that is
there. Nothing makes the regularity hold ; it just holds.
Given this, let w and w∗ be two worlds that are exactly the same,
in every conceivable respect, up until time t. The Humean says : there
is absolutely no reason why w and w∗ should not diverge after t. The
Humean actually allows for any divergence at all. The divergence can be
total.
Why does the Humean allow for such a divergence ? The Humean
doesn’t countenance the idea of there being forces of any kind. Nothing
makes anything else happen. Forces, if they exist at all, are just re-
gularities. There are no nomic necessities. There is nothing to a world
underlying the states of affairs in it. So no matter how much two worlds
are alike before t, there is no limit to how much they can differ — not
just logically but nomically — after t.
This means that, if you are a Humean, alternative worlds are useless
for validating counter-factuals. Suppose, once again, that in our world,
Bob did not shoot Smith at t. And suppose that w is some other world
where Bob does shoot Smith at t, but is otherwise just like our world.
(To make things as easy as possible for the factualist, let us waive all
the problems we’ve been discussing relating to this kind of supposition.)
A Humean will say :
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I have absolutely no idea what happens in w after t. It is
perfectly possible that Smith feels no remorse ; it is perfectly
possible that he turns into a blue-berry. w doesn’t favor the
one outcome more than the other.
Laws are just regularities. Events just happen. There are no under-
lying dispositions. In our world, it happens that people often feel remorse
after committing crimes. But this fact is not grounded in some under-
lying disposition. Our world is no more disposed to favor Smith’s feeling
remorse after shooting Jones than it is disposed to favor Smith’s turning
into a blueberry. It just happens that Smith does feel remorse and does
not turn into a blueberry.
By the same logic, w is no more disposed to favor Smith’s feeling
remorse after shooting Jones than his turning into a blueberry. It could
well be that, in w, Smith does turn into a blueberry. Nothing about w
favors one outcome more than any other. To think otherwise is to have
a wrong conception of natural law : it is to think of laws as things that
underlie regularities. In fact, laws are the regularities.
For a Humean, there will be as many worlds where Brown feels no
remorse after shooting Smith — where, in fact, he turns into a blueberry
or feels elated or succumbs to amnesia — as there are worlds where he
does feel remorse. So, for a Humean, what goes on in other worlds is
as likely to falsify a counter-factual as it is to validate it. Actually, if
Hume is right, then — depending on one’s views on the arithmetic of
infinitely large numbers — what goes on in other worlds is infinitely more
likely to falsify a given counter-factual claim than it is to validate it. For
every world where Brown feels remorse after shooting Smith, there are
infinitely many worlds where Smith doesn’t feel any remorse.
To sum up, if laws are non-Humean, then they cannot be suspended.
Miracles are not even conceptually possible. And the factualist’s position
fails. On the other hand, if laws are Humean, then the occurrences in
other worlds are at least as likely to falsify our counter-factuals as they
are to validate them. So miracles are useless for the factualist.
Some final remarks
There are two incidental points. We’ve seen that, if laws are non-
Humean, then miracles are surds — they are in the same category as four-
sided triangles. But it can be shown that, if laws are Humean, miracles
are no better off.
If laws are Humean, then given such and such initial conditions, the
world is no more disposed to do one thing than another. In a Hume-
world, the world is no more disposed to produce a vase-shattering after
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a vase-dropping than it is to produce a case of a vase turning into a
pumpkin. So if, after being dropped from a tall building, the vase should
turn into a pumpkin, that would be no more miraculous than if it were
to shatter. Of course, if the vase shatters, there is no miracle. Thus, if
the vase turns into a pumpkin — or simply fails to break — that is no
miracle either. In a Hume world, nothing that happens, no matter how
unusual, is a miracle.
So if laws are Humean, the concept of a miracle has no content. As
we’ve seen, if laws are non-Humean, then that concept is incoherent. So
the concept of a miracle seems to be quite broken.
The other incidental point is this. As we’ve just seen, for a Humean,
two worlds can be exactly alike, in every conceivable respect, before time
t, and yet diverge without limit after t. This has often been taken to show
that Humean laws do not support counter-factuals (See [Mackie 1973].
But this is absolutely the wrong conclusion to draw. The right conclu-
sion to draw is that Humean laws don’t support counter-factuals if
counter-factuals are seen as making statements about alternative worlds.
If counter-factuals are understood in some other way, then there is a
chance that Humean laws do support counter-factuals. We have seen
that, indeed, counter-factuals must be understood in some other way :
the alternative-worlds account is a failure. And we will see later that,
in fact, Humean laws do support counter-factuals, contrary to what is
generally held.
VII. Now it is time to give a positive analysis. As we’ve seen, counter-
factuals do not make statements about states of affairs. Given this, there
is, ultimately, only one thing to say. We must see counterfactuals as ma-
king purely epistemic statements — as making statements about rela-
tions between propositions. They must be statements to the effect that
one proposition gives a very high degree of probability (perhaps 100%)
to some other proposition.
Let us get clear on a couple of basic points about probability. First
of all, probability is a relation between propositions ; it is not a property
of states of affairs. Statements like the following are often true :
(9) The probability that Socrates had four kidneys is 5%.
But either Socrates did, or he did not, have four kidneys. It couldn’t
be 5% true that he had four kidneys. The same is true mutatis mutandis
of
(10) The probability that Bill is on the North Pole right now is .002%
Counterfactuals: The Epistemic Analysis 101
But obviously it cannot .002% true that Bill is on the North Pole. It
is either a 100% true or 0% true.
Obviously (9) and (10) make statements about the credibility that
certain propositions give to other propositions7. Let us focus on (9).
Anyone affirming (9) is affirming it on the basis of certain pieces of
(putative) knowledge that he has. He knows that most people don’t
have four kidneys, but that some people do. He knows, on the basis of a
careful reading of the platonic dialogues, that Socrates had some of the
symptoms had by people with that condition. But he also knows that
Socrates had some other illness which would explain his having those
symptoms.
Let P1 . . . Pn be all these propositions. In affirming (9), our man is
really saying that P1 . . . Pn give a certain degree of credibility to the
proposition that Socrates had four kidneys. Obviously the same consi-
derations (mutatis mutandis) apply to (10).
So (9) is really elliptical for : P1 . . . Pn give such and such credibility
to the proposition that Socrates had four kidneys, where P1 . . . Pn are the
propositions our man believes true.
Of course, different people can token a sentence like “the probability
that Socrates had four kidneys is 5%”. And those people can have dif-
ferent data in mind. Under this circumstance, different statements are
being made. Joe might token (9) on the basis of some piece of knowledge
unknown to Jerry, who tokens the same sentence. We must hold that, in
such a case, Joe and Jerry are really making different statements : Joe
is saying
(11) S gives such and such credibility to the proposition Socrates is
bald
where S is some conjunction of proposition.
On the other hand, Jerry is saying
(12) S∗ gives such and such credibility to the proposition Socrates is
bald
where S∗ is some set of propositions other than S.
Consider the following dialogue :
Smith : How probable is it that Brown watches over three
hours of T.V. a day ?
Jones : The probability is around 2%. For only 2% of human
7Keynes’ work on probability is based on this point, which he very clearly states
at the beginning of his treatise. See [Keynes 1921, §§ 2–3].
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beings watch that much T.V.
Smith : But Brown is an American.
Jones : In that case, the probability is 75%.
Smith : But Jones is a prolific author.
Jones : In that case, the probability goes down to 4%. You
see, prolific authors tend to watch very little T.V.
Smith : But Brown’s writing concerns contemporary T.V.
shows.
Jones : In that case, the probability goes up to 85%.
Each of Jones’ statements is (or may be) correct. How is this possible ?
For Jones seems to be contradicting himself. First he says that a certain
proposition has only a 2% chance of true. But then he says it has a 75%
chance of being true.
In fact, Jones is not contradicting himself. First he says : given that
Brown is a human, there is a 2% chance he watches more than three
hours of T.V. a day. Then Jones says : given that Brown is an American,
there is an 85% chance that he watches that much T.V. These assertions
are consistent.
It is clear, then, that probability is an epistemic, not a metaphysical,
notion. Probability is a logical relation between propositions ; it is not a
property of states of affairs.
When you utter (9), you are saying that, given the data at your
disposal, it is epistemically possible to degree .05 that Socrates will turn
out to have had four kidneys. In other words, P1 . . . Pn give probability
.05 to the proposition Socrates had four kidneys, where P1 . . . Pn are the
propositions you know to be true.
Obviously it is not now metaphysically possible for Socrates to have
had four kidneys (in this world) unless he actually had four kidneys. That
is an all or nothing affair — no percentages can be attached to a truth.
So when you affirm (9), you couldn’t possibly be talking about what is
now metaphysically possible, but rather about what is now epistemically
possible. And that means : what is not ruled out by the propositions that
are currently known to you.
The meaning of
(13) if Kennedy hadn’t died in ’63, Johnson wouldn’t have become
President in ’63
can only be
(14) The propositions P1 . . . Pn give a high degree of credibility to
the proposition Johnson didn’t become President in ’63,
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where P1 . . . Pn is some set of propositions that includes : Kennedy
didn’t die in ’63.
It must be kept in mind that false propositions probabilify other
propositions just like true ones. The proposition the moon is made of
cheese is false, but that doesn’t stop it from giving a very high degree
of probability (essentially 100%) to the proposition there is a piece of
cheese that weighs more than 100 lbs. The proposition Kennedy didn’t
die in ’63 is false, but it still gives probability to other propositions. It
gives nearly 100% probability to the proposition some living organism
weighing over 10 lbs didn’t die in ’63. And it gives some probability,
though not nearly as much (at least not when taken by itself), to the
proposition Johnson didn’t become President in ’63.
Notice that our purely propositional analysis of counterfactuals doesn’t
have the problem faced by the factualist analysis. The factualist analysis
needs to keep the laws the same but vary the events : which, as we’ve
seen, it is typically not logically possible to do without undermining the
counterfactual. Given that it is logically impossible, it follows that it
is metaphysically impossible. So the factualist needs the metaphysical
possibility of something which isn’t metaphysically possible.
But we don’t need the metaphysical possibility of anything. What we
do is merely to register the confirmation relations of some proposition,
namely Kennedy did not die in ’63. We don’t need there to be a world
that has the same laws as ours but where Kennedy didn’t die. Such a
world may well not be possible, in any but an epistemic sense. For if
the laws in w are the same as ours, then any difference between our
world and w that is sufficient for keeping Kennedy from dying is almost
certainly going to be sufficient for a lot of other things that will make
(v) be false — it might be sufficient for there not being a Kennedy or
for Kennedy’s dying of hemorrhagic fever in ’63. All we need to make
(v) true is the existence of some set of propositions P1 . . . Pn — where
Kennedy did not die is among them — such that those propositions give
a high degree of credibility to the proposition Johnson did not become
President in ’63.
There is, I grant, more to it than that. (To facilitate discussion, let us
suppose that Pn is the proposition Kennedy did not die in ’63.) We can-
not, of course, allow just any proposition to be included in P1 . . . Pn−1. It
isn’t clear what all of the selection criteria are, but it is clear what some
of them must be. Trivially, P1 . . . Pn−1 cannot include the proposition
Johnson didn’t become President in ’63. Less trivially, P1 . . . Pn−1 can-
not include propositions known to be false ; for example, P3 cannot be
the proposition the black plague kills all American politicians (including
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Johnson) in ’63. Also, P1 . . . Pn−1 cannot exclude propositions that we
know to be true. Suppose we knew that Kennedy was dying of a rapidly
progressing form of cancer which kills its victims in under three weeks.
Obviously we couldn’t exclude that from P1 . . . Pn−1. The rule seems to
be that P1 . . . Pn−1 must include all and only known propositions.
But perhaps this rule is a bit simplistic. What a biologist considers
counterfactually possible differs from what a physicist would consider
counterfactually possible. If you ask a biologist whether a given zygote
could have acquired a certain morphology in due course (say, that of a
male), he may say “why of course : it is completely open which gender a
zygote assumes — so of course it could have acquired that morphology”.
But if you ask a physicist the same question he may say : “given the
initial positions and momenta of the atoms composing that zygote and
composing the neighboring physical systems [and so on], it was inevitable
that it would eventually assume that morphology.” The biologist seems
to be saying : nothing that falls within the scope of biology rules out the
possibility that the zygote would become a female, not that nothing tout
court rules it out. The physics is saying : something that falls within the
scope of physics rules out the zygote’s becoming a female.
Similarly, if you ask an economist and a historian what was counter-
factually possible — whether Saddam would have done such and such
if thus and such — they may give different answers ; for the historian
will relativize his statement to propositions falling within the scope of
his broadly historical concerns, whereas the economist will consider a
slightly different data set.
But this relevance constraint might well reduce to the fact that the
physicist knows certain things that the biologist does not and that the
economist knows certain things that the historian does not (and per-
haps vice versa). So it may be true that the one selection criterion is :
P1 . . . Pn−1 must include all and only those propositions known (or rea-
sonably believed) to be true by the person affirming the counterfactual
(excluding, of course, the proposition whose negation is the antecedent
of the counterfactual).
And it is clear that, given any one person, a great deal is epistemically
possible from his perspective that is not objectively (metaphysically) pos-
sible. It was epistemically, but not metaphysically, possible that Hesperus
should be distinct from Hesperus. Given only what I know, it is episte-
mically possible that the laws of physics remain exactly what they are
and that there will not be an earthquake in California in the next year.
But it might well be a logical impossibility — not a nomic or even a
mere metaphysical impossibility — that the conjunction :
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(*)P1 . . . Pn and C1 . . . Ck and there is no earthquake in California in
the next year
should be true, where P1 . . . Pn is the set of propositions giving the
laws of physics and C1 . . . Ck is the set of propositions describing the
current condition of the California landmass. (*) may well be logically
false because, given the relevant conditions and laws, it may follow de-
ductively that there is an earthquake in California in the next year. In
fact, this is the case if, in fact, there will be such an earthquake and the
laws in question are deterministic.
For our analysis of counterfactuals to work, it is necessary only that
relative to what is known, some untrue proposition, conjoined with pro-
positions embodying the just mentioned knowledge, give high credibility
to some other proposition. We don’t need some set of initial conditions
that didn’t hold to actually hold, albeit in some other world, all the
while making sure that our laws apply in that other world. All those
desiderata cannot be jointly satisfied.
All we need is for some proposition (the consequent of the coun-
terfactual) to be epistemically possible relative to some false proposition
(the antecedent of the counterfactual) conjoined with what we know (mi-
nus our knowledge that the antecedent is false). And that is an extre-
mely liberal constraint. For what is possible relative to what we know
is extremely inclusive. It is possible, relative to what I know (minus my
knowledge that Johnson did become President in ’63) conjoined with the
proposition Kennedy didn’t die in ’63, that Johnson did not become Pre-
sident in ’63. In other words, if p1 . . .pm are the propositions embodying
what I know, minus the proposition that Johnson became President in
’63, then the conjunction of p1 . . . pm and Kennedy didn’t die in ’63 gives
high probability to the proposition Johnson didn’t become President in
’63. And that is what it is for the counter-factual if Kennedy didn’t die
in ’63, Johnson wouldn’t have become President in ’63 to be true.
If I were an extremely knowledgeable historian, it might not be the
case that, relative to what I know, Johnson didn’t become President was
epistemically possible for me. But that is consistent with the nature of
counterfactuals. The more a person knows, the fewer counterfactuals he
can coherently entertain. If you ask somebody who knows nothing about
American history what was possible for the country in 1813, he will say
“just about anything”. If you ask somebody who knew exactly how much
money was in the treasury, exactly what the President at the time was
thinking, exactly where the troops were stationed, and so on, that person
will probably have a different answer.
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This point about possibility obviously maps onto one about counter-
factuals. Assuming maximal rationality on the part of the respondents
(so that we don’t have to worry about incompetence on their part)8,
the question “what would have happened to the U.S. if(. . . ) ?” gets very
different answers from different people depending on what those people
know. This doesn’t mean that one of them is right and the other is
wrong. It means that the question is inherently epistemic. One of the
respondents, because he knows too much, cannot (without contradicting
himself) fit the antecedent of the counterfactual into the list of propo-
sitions he knows to be true. The antecedent isn’t epistemically possible
for him (given what he knows). So he rightly balks at the question. But
the antecedent is epistemically possible for the other respondent ; so he
doesn’t balk.
VIII. To facilitate further discussion, I’d like to introduce a notatio-
nal convention. For any event or state of affairs S, we will let P (S) be
the proposition affirming S’s existence.
There are many apparent problems with our analysis of counter-
factuals. I’d like to say why, in my view, they are not actual problems
for it9.
According to your analysis, the meaning of “if A were the
case, then B would be the case” is :
P (A) (together with certain other propositions) gives a high-
degree of credibility to P (B).
It seems to me that your analysis is vulnerable to an exact
analogue of the argument you directed against the factualist
analysis. If A were the case, it would obviously be caused
by some pre-existing state of affairs C1. And C1, in its turn,
would be caused by some pre-existing state of affairs C2. And
so on. Of course, for each i, Ci would be a state of affairs that
8Wemust make this assumption. It isn’t worth considering the case where stupidity
affects what answers the person gives. I am assuming that counter-factuals are objec-
tively true or false — they are not mere expressions of how we feel. (Some, amazingly,
have argued that they are expressions of feeling. I think that ultimately — despite his
numerous disclaimers — Blackburn has essentially this view. See [Blackburn 1984,
chapter 6] and [Blackburn 1993]. I am arguing that correct counter-factuals are sta-
tements of the form : P1 . . . Pn gives such and such credibility to Pn+1. Obviously I
want to illustrate this point by discussing people who assign the right probability to
Pn+1, given P1 . . . Pn, not the ones who do it the wrong way.
9All of the subsequent problems I will deal with — in other words, the points
made by the objector — are points actually made to me by a very astute reviewer at
Philosophia Scientiae.
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did not actually obtain. For reasons you described at great
length, the conjunction P (A) and P (C1) . . . P (Cn) would ei-
ther give little or no probability to P (B) or that conjunction
would probability propositions that were not even counter-
factually true. So your analysis fails for the very same reasons
that the factualist analysis fails.
This point overlooks the very thing that distinguishes my epistemic
analysis from the factualist analysis. Imagine the following. You and I
are homicide detectives. We are trying to solve the murder of Smith. We
did not witness the murder, and neither did anyone else. But we have
data that incriminates Brown. Brown’s finger-prints are found on the
knife lodged in Smith’s rib-cage. Specimens of Smith’s hair and blood
were found in Brown’s car and home. And so on. Let P1 . . . Pn be the
propositions that describe all of the data that we’ve gathered so far, along
with the propositions that embody our knowledge of general regularities
and causal laws. And let P (M) be the proposition : Brown killed Smith.
By themselves, P1 . . . Pn give a certain degree of probability to P (M).
That probability is less than 100%, but is still quite high. Given only
P1 . . . Pn, it is still open whether Brown murdered Smith. For P1 . . . Pndon’t
entail P (M). Perhaps Brown is being framed, and the evidence in ques-
tion was planted. Perhaps, unknown to the world, Brown has an identical
twin — who has the same finger-prints and genetic profile as Brown —
and that twin committed the murder. That is all well and good. But
there is no disputing that P1 . . . Pn, by themselves, give a certain pro-
bability to P (M). We don’t need new data to decide whether P1 . . . Pn
probability P (M). They obviously do probabilify it.
Of course, there are many propositions Pn+1 such that P1 . . . Pn+1
give extremely low probability to P (M). Pn+1 could be the proposition :
Jones, not Brown, killed Smith. This would be a trivial example. A less
trivial example would be the case where Pn+1 is the proposition : Brown
has a sociopathic identical twin who has the same genetic markers as
Brown and also has a key to Brown’s car and house and has a habit of
framing Brown.
But the proposition P1 . . . Pn give 95% probability to P(M) is simply
distinct from the proposition P1 . . . Pn+1 give 95% probability to P(M).
In fact, those two propositions must have different truth-values, unless
Pn+1 is some completely irrelevant datum.
Of course, to solve the homicide, we do need new data. But we need
new data not to decide whether P1 . . . Pnprobabilify P (B). They do pro-
babilify it ; we know that. We need new data to decide whether in fact
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P (M) is true. But it is beyond dispute that, by themselves, P1 . . . Pn
probabilify P (M).
Indeed, new empirical data will not have any bearing on how much
P1 . . . Pn probabilify P (M). New empirical data will bear on whether
P (M) is true or not. But the relationship between P1 . . . Pn and P (M)
is a purely logical relationship. Granted P1 . . . Pn do not entail P (M).
But the proposition : if P1 . . . Pn, then P (M) has a 95% likelihood of
being true is not itself an empirical proposition. P1 . . . Pn is an empi-
rical proposition. And so is P (M). But the conditional proposition if
P1 . . . Pn, then P (M) has a 95% likelihood of being true is not empiri-
cal10.
When one makes a probability-assertion, one is making a statement
about the bearing of what one knows on some proposition not yet known
to be true. One is not making a statement about the bearing of the to-
tality of true propositions on some other proposition. Socrates either
had two kidneys or he didn’t. And yet the statement it is 98% likely
that Socrates had two kidneys may well be true. (More exactly, it may
be elliptical for a true statement.) That statement does not mean : the
conjunction of all true propositions gives 98% probability to the propo-
sition that Socrates had two kidneys. Probability statements never have
that form. For the conjunction of all true propositions will either give
100% or 0% probability to any given proposition, depending on whether
the given proposition is true or false. And, except to illustrate some pu-
rely theoretical point, we are not interested in such cases. Probability
statements do have the form
(15) if P , then the probability of Q being true is such and such.
If we add propositions to the antecedent, we get an entirely different
probability statement. If we add P2 . . . P37 to the antecedent, then we
end up with the statement
(16) if P and P2 and (. . .)P37, then the probability of Q is such and
such.
But (15) is a completely different proposition from (16).
My analysis of counter-factuals is this : if A had been the case, then
B would have been the case means : The proposition
(17) K and P (A) gives a high probability to P (B),
where K is the conjunction of propositions we know to be true, mi-
nus the proposition that A and B were not the case. Of course, (17) is
equivalent to :
10This crucial point about probability statements is made and decisively argued
for in [Bonjour 1998].
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(18) if K and P (A) are the case, then it is highly probable that P (B)
is true.
If we add propositions to the antecedent of (18), then we simply end
up with a different proposition from (18). The objector says that we
must add such antecedents. But the truth is : we must not to do so. And
this obligation not to do so lies at the heart of the concept of probability.
So there is no regress of any kind, and no analogue of the argument we
used against the factualist is generated.
IX. Here is another objection to our analysis :
An alternative world is usually thought of as a set of proposi-
tions. Let’s suppose this is right. In that case, I don’t see how
your view differs from that of the factualist. You say that a
counter-factual registers some relation — presumably one of
entailment or confirmation — holding among propositions.
According to the factualist, a counter-factual says what is
the case in some other world. If that other world just is a
set of propositions, then he is really affirming the existence
of some kind of relationship – presumably one of entailment
or confirmation — among propositions. He is saying that, if
P1 . . . Pn are true, then so (probably) is some other propo-
sition Q. (Among P1 . . . Pn is the proposition affirming the
antecedent of the counter-factual. The remainder are those
propositions that describe our world minus the ones that are
inconsistent with the proposition affirming the antecedent of
the counter-factual.)
Basically, if worlds just are sets of propositions, then the
factualist approach collapses into your epistemic approach.
And your approach therefore cannot possibly be superior to
the factualist approach.
There are two problems with the objector’s point. First, worlds are
not sets of propositions. Second, while it is true that many factualists
identify worlds with sets of propositions, the sets they have in mind —
so-called “maximal consistent sets” — are absolutely useless for analyzing
counter-factuals.
When I use the term “world”, I mean what is ordinarily meant by that
term : I mean the kind of thing that this world is. Our world is not a set
of propositions. Our world is something which makes sets of propositions
be true or false. Any world deserving of the name is something which
makes propositions be true or false. A set of propositions does not make
110 John-Michael Kuczynski
propositions be true or false. The set of propositions <snow is white,
grass is green, penguins fly> doesn’t make any of those propositions be
true or false. That set exists regardless of whether penguins fly, regardless
of whether grass is orange.
Granted, there are may who maintain both that counter-factuals re-
gister facts about other “worlds” and who say that other “worlds” are just
sets of propositions. Let us refer to such people as “weak factualists”. (A
“strong factualist” would be somebody, like David Lewis, who is a fac-
tualist and who holds that alternative worlds are concrete entities, not
sets of propositions.)
There are many weak factualists. In fact, so far as I know, every one
who writes about counter-factuals, apart from Lewis, is a weak factualist.
But weak factualists never, absolutely never, hold that counter-factuals
register relations of probabilification among propositions. In my view,
that is what they should hold. But it isn’t what they hold.
What do weak factualists hold ? It seems to me that what is going
on is this. They start out by accepting Lewis’ analysis. But they are not
willing to go so far as to say that there really are alternative worlds, in
any literal sense of “world”. But they want to hold onto the Lewisian
analysis, presumably because that analysis obviously does an excellent
job of capturing our pre-theoretical understanding of counter-factuals.
So, on the one hand, the weak-factualist isn’t willing to completely give
in and treat counter-factuals as inter-propositional relations. (That is
why, prior to this paper, no factualist has ever said flat out that if Ken-
nedy had not been shot, Johnson would not have become President in
’63 holds entirely in virtue of some confirmation or entailment relation
holding among propositions.) But on the other hand, the weak-factualist
isn’t willing to go in the other direction : he isn’t willing to say that there
really are other worlds. A fortiori he isn’t wiling to say that concrete oc-
currences are what make counter-factuals be true. So the weak-factualist
denies that counter-factuals merely register relations of probabilification
(or entailment) among propositions. And he denies that counter-factuals
register facts relating to other worlds (in any genuine sense of “world”).
So his position is completely incoherent.
If we are to understand counter-factuals, we must completely jettison
the notion of alternative worlds. If by “world” we mean something at
all like our world, then counter-factuals are not to be understood in
terms of worlds. If by “world” we just mean “set of propositions”, then
we should just talk about sets of propositions, and not let a misleading
bit of terminology create the illusion of explanation.
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There is more to say. Apart from Lewis, everyone who uses the no-
tion of other worlds identifies worlds with sets of propositions. But they
don’t ever say that a world is just any set of propositions. They always
identify worlds with what are called maximal consistent sets. What is a
maximal consistent set of propositions ? S is a maximal consistent set of
propositions iff, for any atomic proposition P 11, either P or its negation
is included in S.
Why are worlds identified with maximal consistent sets ? The reason
is clear. Consider the following set of propositions. <Grass is green, pen-
guins fly>. This set of propositions obviously doesn’t determine a world ;
too much is left out. Any number of different worlds could accommo-
date this set. A world is supposed to something which is determinate in
every respect. The set <Grass is green, penguins fly> leaves too many
things indeterminate. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that that set
were a world — call it w. In that case, the following questions would
have no answer. “Are there tigers in w ? Are there nine planets in the
solar system in w ? Did Keats live to be 90 in w ?” Obviously w is much
too thread-bare to count as a world : a world is something which gives
answers to questions.
So if worlds are, with any plausibility, to be identified with sets of
propositions, they must be sets of propositions that don’t leave too many
questions unanswered. To turn w into something that is even minimally
deserving of the title “world”, we have to flesh it out — we have keep
adding propositions to it until w becomes capable of settling all the
questions we might pose about it. This means that, for any question Q
we might have about w, one of the propositions in w must be an answer
to Q or the propositions that are in w must entail an answer to Q.
Now we can see why alternative worlds, in the sense of maximal
consistent sets of propositions, are absolutely useless for analyzing counter-
factuals. Consider the counter-factual
(19) if Kennedy had not been assassinated, then he would have been
President until ’68.
Here is what the weak-factualist says :
(19) is true because in some world w, Kennedy was not as-
sassinated and, in w, he remained President until ’68. w is
a set of propositions. w comprises the proposition Kennedy
was not assassinated. With that qualification, w is as much
like the set of propositions that describe our world as any
11An atomic proposition is one that is not a generalization of some kind and is not
built out of other propositions.
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consistent set of propositions could be. w also comprises the
proposition Kennedy was President until ’68.
But, in effect, we’ve already seen the problem with this view. If w is
to comprise the proposition Kennedy was not assassinated, then either w
is will be replete with inconsistencies or w will describe a world so utterly
different from our world that it almost certainly does not comprise the
proposition Kennedy was President until ’68.
Remember what we said about the strong-factualist position. If w is
a world, in the literal sense, in which Kennedy is not assassinated, then
w will differ from our world in so many ways that, in w, it is exceedingly
unlikely that Kennedy is President until ’68 : under those circumstances,
it is unlikely that Kennedy even exists.
This fact about w corresponds to a fact about the set of propositions
describing w. That set must include Kennedy was not assassinated. But
if that set is to be consistent, then it must be dramatically different from
the set of propositions which describes our world. But if the former set
is that different from the latter, then it is, at best, minimally likely that
it also comprises the proposition Kennedy was President until ’68.
All the points that we earlier made about worlds are really points
about propositions describing worlds. The position of the weak-factualist
is very close to that of the strong-factualist. The only difference is that
the weak-factualist talks about the propositions describing worlds, whe-
reas the strong-factualist talks about worlds themselves. But all of the
problems bedeviling the strong-factualist position are problems with the
proposition describing worlds : there is no way to insert the antecedent
of a counter-factual into that set without making the set prohibitively
different from the set of propositions which describes our world. So the
weak-factualist position is barely any better than the strong-factualist
one.
The problem with the weak-factualist position is that maximal consistent
sets comprise too many propositions. A maximal consistent set answers
too many questions. Among those questions are questions relating to
nomic relations among propositions. So if a consistent set is going to
comprise a proposition affirming some proposition that is not true of our
world — some proposition that could be the antecedent of a counter-
factual — then one of two things holds. (a) That set will describe a
world that bears no resemblance to ours. (b) That set is going to have
to leave a lot of questions unanswered.
If (a), then the set is useless for running counter-factuals. If (b), then
the set is not a maximally consistent set, but only some tiny subset of
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such a set. So the weak-factualist ends up identifying worlds with tiny
subsets of maximal consistent sets of propositions.
I grant that if he does this, then his position can work. But if he does
that, then his position does not have anything to do with “worlds” at all,
not even relative to the most permissive interpretation of that term. Eve-
ryone who talks about possible worlds is either talking about concrete
worlds or about maximal sets of propositions. On either reading, the
correct analysis of counter-factuals cannot possibly have anything to do
with possible worlds.
X. These points enable us to deal with another objection :
You say that counter-factuals register relations of some kind
holding among propositions, not among worlds. These days
propositions are generally held to be sets of worlds or, at
any rate, functions involving worlds. If this conception is the
right one, then I don’t see the difference between your “episte-
mic” analysis and the traditional “factualist” one. Both ana-
lyses, apparently, turn counter-factuals into relations holding
among propositions.
Again, we must distinguish definitions from analyses. It is, indeed,
widely held that propositions are sets of worlds, or functions involving
worlds. But this is not a definition of “proposition” ; it is a controversial
analysis of what propositions are.
The uncontroversial definition of “proposition” is this : propositions
are those things that are non-derivatively true or false. Sentences are
true or false, but only because they bear propositions. (“Snow is white”
is true entirely because it bears the proposition snow is white.) Beliefs are
true or false, but only because they encode propositions. (My belief that
snow is white is true entirely because it encodes the proposition snow is
white.) Whenever we have something that is true or false, we either have
a proposition or we have something which inherits its truth-value from
a proposition.
When I use the term “proposition”, all I mean is : something which is
non-derivatively true or false. I mean the kinds of things that are believed
and expressed by sentences.
To facilitate discussion, let “possible world semantics” (PWS) be our
term for the view that propositions are sets of worlds or functions invol-
ving worlds.
The objector says that if PWS is correct, then my analysis is not
(appreciably) different from the factualist one. I must disagree.
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If someone advocates PWS, he cannot then say that worlds are them-
selves sets of propositions. For then his analysis of “proposition” is this : a
proposition is a set of sets of propositions or is a function from sets of sets
of propositions to truth-values. Obviously such an analysis is viciously
circular.
So someone who advocates PWS is quite definitely committed to the
view that worlds are not sets of propositions. He is therefore committed
to the view that worlds are concrete objects.
As we have seen, if worlds are concrete objects, then the factua-
list position fails. So contrary to what the objector says, the factualist
must hold that propositions are not sets of worlds or functions involving
worlds.
But even if we leave aside the last point, the objector’s point fails.
For the sake of argument, suppose the objector is right about proposi-
tions : suppose that, indeed, propositions are sets of worlds or functions
involving worlds. Within this framework, how are we to analyze the no-
tion of entailment ? In other words, supposing that PWS is right, what
is it for P to entail Q ?
The only answer that is possible within this framework is this : P
entails Q iff every “world” in which P is true is a world in which Q is
true12. In other words, Q is the case in every world in which P is the
case.
But this answer is not the right one. Water is wet is true in every
world in which H2O is wet is true, and vice versa. But no entailment
relation holds between the two propositions. A relation of necessitation
holds, but not one of entailment.
Of course, an advocate of PWS will try to amend that doctrine, so
that it it will recognize the distinction between entailment and necessity.
I wish to show that no such amendment is possible. Let us start with
some truisms.
For P to entail Q is simply for not [P and not Q] to be a logical or
analytic truth. (This is a truism, not a controversial analysis.)
There are no worlds in which the following is true : x is water and
is not H2O. According to PWS, that is why x is water necessitates x is
H2O.
There are no worlds in which x is a triangle and is does not have
three sides. According to PWS, that is why x is a triangle necessitates
x has three sides.
12And this is precisely the answer given by Hintikka, Carnap, and countless others.
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But x is a triangle not only necessitates x has three sides. The first
entails the second. By contrast, x is water does not entail x is H2O.
How does PWS explain this difference ? PWS has only a couple of
options. One of these is to say :
(E) There are epistemically possible worlds where the pro-
position [x is water and x is not H2O] is true. And because
such worlds are epistemically possible, one is not guilty of
incoherence in believing that proposition.
But (E) is doubly incoherent. First of all, there are no worlds where
that proposition is true. A fortiori there are no epistemically possible
worlds where it is true.
Granted, that proposition is true in some worlds, if by “world” we
mean only “set of propositions. But as we saw earlier, this cannot be
what an advocate of PWS means by world. For if this is what he means,
then his analysis of proposition becomes : a proposition is a function from
sets of sets of propositions to truth-values. To avoid vicious circularity,
the advocate of PWS must have concrete worlds in mind. There are no
concrete worlds where the proposition [x is water and x is not H2O]
holds. So, in effect, there are no worlds where it holds.
There is a second reason why (E) is incoherent. As we saw earlier, the
notion of epistemic possibility is to be defined in terms of the notion of
self-contradiction. So PWS cannot use that notion to analyze the notion
of entailment or, therefore, of self-contradiction.
We’ve considered one way that PWS might try to analyze the notion
of entailment. And we’ve seen that this way fails. What other options
does PWS have ? It could say this :
There are no worlds where [x is water and x is not H2O]
is true. And there are no worlds where [x is a triangle and
x does not have three sides] is true. Nonetheless, one isn’t
guilty of incoherence if one believes that there are worlds
of the former kind. But one is guilty of incoherence if one
believes in worlds of the second of kind. That is why x is a
triangle entails x has three sides, whereas x is water does not
entail x has three sides.
But if he says this, the proponent of PWS is giving up on the idea
that entailment can be analyzed in terms of relations among worlds. For
he is, in effect, saying that the relevant relation among worlds must itself
be understood in terms of entailment.
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Uncontroversially, P entails Q iff [P and not Q] is self-contradictory
and iff not [P and not Q] is logically necessary. (This is an uncontro-
versial truism, not an analysis.) The objector says : P entails Q iff it
is self-contradictory to believe in a world where [P and not Q] is true.
This is tantamount to : [P and not Q] is self-contradictory iff it is self-
contradictory to believe in a world where [P and not Q].
This last point is true enough. But it is no analysis of the notion of
self-contradiction. It uses that notion ; it presupposes it. It is therefore
no analysis of it.
PWS completely and utterly fails to elucidate the notion of en-
tailment. Whenever we try to analyze entailment in terms of relations
among worlds, we end up presupposing that very notion. P entails Q if,
given P , Q is not just necessary, but epistemically necessary. To keep
epistemic necessity from collapsing into metaphysical necessity, PWS
must invoke the notion of coherence. But once PWS does that, then its
analysis of entailment becomes viciously circular.
I submit that, because PWS fails to analyses to the notion of en-
tailment, it must be taken to be a wholesale failure. The notion of en-
tailment is intimately related to the notion of a proposition. In fact, a
standard view is that a proposition P is the class of its logical conse-
quences13. Even if that view is false, the relationship between the notion
of entailment and propositionality is almost one of identity : as a matter
of conceptual necessity, all and only propositions stand in entailment-
relations.
Clearly the relation between these two concepts is so deep that, if a
doctrine fails to analyze the concept of entailment, then it fails to ana-
lyze the concept of a proposition. PWS fails to analyze the former. We
must conclude that it fails to analyze the latter : it doesn’t give a correct
of what propositions are. Propositions are not sets of worlds or functions
involving worlds. The notion of a proposition is not to be analyzed in
terms of the notion of a world. This fact blocks attempts to view my
epistemic analysis as a version of the factualist analysis.
13[Lewis C. I. 1946], [Carnap 1947], and countless others have held this. I myself
hold a version of this view. It has to be refined a bit to avoid some set-theoretical
paradoxes. But the basic idea is unquestionably correct. If P entails Q then there is
obviously an internal relationship between P and Q : a relationship that couldn’t
possibly hold between two distinct things. See [Ramsey 1990/1927, 42]. So some
kind of containment relationship must hold between them. In my book Conceptual
Atomism and the Computational Theory of Mind (unpublished) I defend, at great
length, this very conception of propositionality. And I show why, contrary to first
appearances, that conception is consistent with the fact that entailments are often
informative.
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XI. I would like to bring up one consideration that favors our analy-
sis. The factualist analysis of counterfactuals is characterized by a certain
circularity. I will argue that the circularity in question is vicious.
Not all true universal statements express laws.
Consider the statement : Every coin in my pocket is a quarter. That
is a true universal statement. For it is equivalent to :
(20) for any x in the universe, if x is a coin in my pocket, then x is
a quarter14.
But (20) does not express a law. Let us contrast (20) with a propo-
sition which does express a law (albeit a derivative one) :
(21) Pinewood floats on water.
What is the difference between (20) and (21) ? The generally accepted
answer is this : (21) supports counter-factuals ; (20) does not. If I were to
put a nickel or a penny in my pocket, it wouldn’t turn into a quarter15.
So the counter-factual claim
(22) For any x, if x were a coin in my pocket, it would be a quarter
is false. And that is why (20) does not express a law. By contrast,
the counter-factual claim :
(23) For any x, if x were a piece of pine-wood placed on water, then
x would float
is true. And that is why it expresses a law. So what is a law ? Here
is a partial answer :
(L) For something to be a law of nature, it is at least necessary that
it support counter-factuals16.
Here is the problem for the factualist. The factualist says that counter-
factuals make statements about other worlds that are like this world,
except in some very limited respect. When we ask the factualist
how are those worlds like our world ?”, he says (among other things) :
“Those other worlds are governed by the same laws as ours.” So the
counter-factualist says :
14This example has been used many times. Goodman [ Goodman 1954] and Hempel
[Hempel 1966] use it to illustrate this very point.
15My choice of examples here was influenced by private discussions with Ernan
McMullen.
16Ayer in [Ayer 1972, 132] writes : “We cannot, indeed, define the concept of natural
law without making use of conditionals — for one thing, we want to allow for there
being laws of nature which have not yet been discovered, and this requires us to
conceive of there being true generalizations which we should treat as generalizations
of law if we cam to believe them (. . . )” Also, see [Mackie 1973, 65] and [Hempel 1966].
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(CF) A counter-factual makes a statement that concerns (or is made
true by) states of affairs in worlds that are governed by the same laws
that govern our world.
Practically everybody, factualists included17, believes (L). So when
we ask a factualist what a law of nature is, he says “it is something that
supports counter-factuals”. And when we ask him what a counter-factual
is, he says “something that is made true by worlds that have the same
laws as our world”. This, it seems to me, is plainly circular.
Granted, not all circularity is vicious. In contemporary philosophy of
science, it is a commonplace18 that scientific theories are characterized
by a certain circularity. A theory is (inter alia) a set of inter-connected,
mutually supporting propositions. Of course, a theory has to have some
roots in data lying outside that theory. But within a theory we may find
many cases of circularity. (Propositions about protons will explain pro-
positions about electrons, and vice versa.) The theory as a whole cannot
be circular : it has to be anchored in, and answerable to, extra-theoretical
facts. But within the theory, there are many cases of propositions giving
explanatory support to one another. So, once again, we see that not all
circularity is vicious19.
Now we can see why the factualist is guilty of vicious circularity.
Scientific theories are given by epistemically contingent propositions ; so
they gain or lose support with new empirical information. What (L) and
(CF) say has nothing do to with anything contingent. They are concep-
tual explanations — attempts at conceptual analysis. (CF) doesn’t say :
“Given the conditions and causal laws that in fact prevail, a counter-
factual is such and such.” (CF) isn’t the kind of proposition that gains
or loses support with new empirical data. Neither is (L). They are both
meant to be non-contingent conceptual analyses. They may be right or
wrong. But they are not propositions that are confirmed or disconfirmed
by empirical data. So we cannot explain away the circularity in question
by saying that it is the innocuous kind (supposedly) characteristic of
scientific theories.
The reason empirical theories aren’t (always) viciously circular is that
such theories are given by epistemically contingent propositions. There-
fore such explanations do not give conceptual analyses : they do not give
17The only philosopher I know of who denies (L) is Bas van Fraassen. But van
Fraassen’s conception of natural law and of counter-factuals does not involve the
notion of possible worlds at all.
18Not one I agree with.
19In his paper “Theories”, Frank Ramsey (supposedly) showed why the kind of
circularity (supposedly) characteristic of empirical theories isn’t vicious.
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the content of propositions. They affirm the existence of (epistemically)
contingent relations among propositions.
But conceptual explanation is a different story. Where that kind of
explanation is a concerned, circularity means a loss of content. The pro-
ponent of (L) is trying to give a conceptual analysis of the concept of a
law of nature : he is trying to give the content of that concept. The pro-
ponent of (CF) is trying to give a conceptual explanation of the concept
of a counter-factual : he is trying to give the content of that concept. So-
mebody who puts forth both (CF) and (L) as conceptual explanations is
incapable of even giving content to either proposition. (CF) has content
only in so far as the concept of (L) has some independent content. And
(L) has content only if the concept of a counter-factual has independent
content. If each has content only on the condition that the other does,
then neither has content. So it is not possible that both (CF) and (L)
should constitute conceptual explanations. But that is exactly what they
are supposed to be.
These points enable us to deal with another attempt to show that
the circularity in the factualist position is innocent. We believe both
(a) bachelors are unmarried males
and
(b) unmarried males are bachelors.
But we are not, on that account, guilty of vicious circularity. There is
an element of circularity in all tautologous beliefs. But one is not guilty
of vicious circularity in virtue of having such beliefs. Perhaps, it might
be thought, it is equally innocent to hold both (CF) and (L).
This is not so. (CF) is meant to be an analysis of the concept of a
counter-factual : it is meant to give the content of that concept. (L) is
meant to be an analysis of the concept of law : it is meant to give the
content of that concept. So, for reasons discussed a moment ago, holding
both (L) and (CF) strips them both of content. That is why the position
is viciously circular.
If I put forth (b) as an analysis of (a), and I also put forth (a) as
an analysis of (b), then I would be guilty of vicious circularity. But that
is not what I do. I believe both (a) and (b). But my analyses of male
and unmarried don’t involve the concept bachelor. They involve different
concepts — concepts relating to certain legal institutions, to possession of
certain reproductive organs, and so on. That is why viciously circularity
is avoided.
XII. On our view, there is no circularity at all. For counterfactuals
are just probability statements, and probability is a notion that can be
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defined totally independently of the notion of a law.
The truth of a probability statement supervenes entirely on what is
known to be the case — not on what would be the case or what must
(in a nomic sense) be the case. Suppose you say ’the probability that
next ball drawn from the urn is .9’. The truth of that statement derives
entirely from what has happened and, indeed, from what has been known
to happen. If it is known that 90% of the balls thus far drawn from the
vase have been white, then (ceteris paribus), that probability statement
is accurate.
Of course, in many cases, knowledge of laws of nature must be ta-
ken into account : the statement “the probability that that bar of steel
conducts electricity better than that piece of rubber is 99.9999%” is ba-
sed on (inter alia) knowledge of laws of nature. But the basis for one’s
belief in those laws of nature ultimately reduces to one’s knowledge of
what has happened. So ultimately probability statements are warran-
ted by what has happened. Suppose Bob is in world w and Bob∗ is in
world w∗ and the evidence available to Bob concerning what has hap-
pened (in w) is identical with that available to Bob∗ concerning what
has happened (in w∗). In that case, Bob and Bob∗ cannot diverge in
their probability-judgments unless one of them is being irrational (or,
in any case, unless one of them is doing a worse job than the other in
analyzing the data)20. So the concept of probability is definable entirely
independently of the concept of law and the concept of what would have
20The obvious response is this :
Suppose that Bob and Bob∗ have the exact same beliefs concerning what has
happened, but Bob knows about laws that Bob∗ doesn’t know about. For example,
Bob knows that metal expands when heated, Bob∗ doesn’t know this, but their
respective knowledge of what has happened — of what states of affairs have obtained
— is the same. In that case, Bob and Bob∗ can rationally assign different probabilities
to, say, the possibility of some metal’s expanding upon being heated.
Remember that whatever probability can reasonably be attached to a putative law
of nature, the sole basis for that evaluation must lie in what has happened : ultimately
all probability-assessments flow from what has happened and, indeed, from what is
known. Of course, Bob may believe in some law L not because he has personally
witnessed states of affairs that confirm it, but because some scientist told him about
it or because he read about it in a book written by an authority. But in this case,
Bob’s ’knowledge’ is obviously parasitic on other people’s knowledge of singular states
of affairs. In the end, what gives probability to a position is the totality of known
singular states of affairs. So the way to respond to the objector is to say : if we
leave aside parasitic knowledge (like Bob’s knowledge of the laws of physics) or,
alternatively, if we take into account the singular knowledge had by the communities
to which Bob and Bob∗ belong, and from which their knowledge of laws is derivative,
then there cannot be a divergence in the probability-assessments of these two people
unless one of them is being irrational or, in any case, unless one of them is evaluating
the data less competently than the other.
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happened (the concept of counterfactuality). So our analysis is not guilty
of circularity.
While being non-circular, our analysis accommodates the fact that
statements of law do, while accidental generalizations do not, support
counter-factuals. Pinewood floats in water states a law and thus supports
counter-factuals. According to our analysis, the statement : if this piece
of pinewood were put in water, it would float means that the proposition :
this piece of pinewood is in water, plus some other set of propositions
P1 . . . Pn (all of them true), gives very high probability to the proposition
this piece of pinewood is floating. Among P1 . . . Pn are propositions like :
all past pieces of pinewood have floated in water and all objects having
a certain composition float in water. The result is that this piece of
pinewood is floating is given vanishingly close to 100% probability. So
our analysis correctly predicts that pinewood floats in water supports
counter-factuals and therefore is not an accidental generalization.
Now consider the universal statement : every person in this room
is a philosopher interested in non-Lewisian analyses of counter-factuals.
This is a true universal statement. But it doesn’t state a law, for it
doesn’t support counter-factuals. If Bjorn Borg21 were a person in this
room, he would be a philosopher interested in non-Lewisian analyses of
counter-factuals is a false counter-factual. According to our analysis,
its meaning is : the proposition Bjorn Borg is a person in this room,
conjoined with certain other propositions P1 . . . Pn, all of them true,
gives extremely high probability to Bjorn Borg is a philosopher interested
in non-Lewisian analyses of counter-factuals. But they do not give high
probability to that assertion. In fact, they give it (vanishingly close to)
0% probability. (For among P1 . . . Pn are propositions like Bjorn Borg
hasn’t the slightest interest in counter-factuals.) So our analysis correctly
predicts that every person in this room is a philosopher does not sustain
counter-factuals and therefore does not state a law.
I must consider a very clever objection to my analysis (due to an
anonymous reviewer) :
You’ve said over and over again that the concept of law is
to be analyzed in terms of the concept of a counter-factual.
But if it is correct, then your analysis of counter-factuals is
deeply absurd.
According to that analysis, counter-factuals are just probability-
or entailment-statements. The counter-factual
(∗)If S had been the case, then S* would have been the case
21The famous tennis player.
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(∗∗) means : P (S), conjoined with P1 . . . Pn, highly confirms
P (S∗),
where P1 . . . Pn are the propositions one knows to be true,
minus the proposition that S was not the case.
So you analyze laws in terms of counter-factuals. But you
analyze counter-factuals as purely logical relations holding
among the propositions we know to be true. So, by impli-
cation, you are advocating a kind of idealism or relativism
about laws. On your analysis, laws are facts about our beliefs
about the world, not about the world itself. But obviously
laws are facts about the world itself, not about our beliefs.
I agree that laws (or, more precisely, the statements affirming them)
necessarily support counter-factuals. I also agree that if counter-factuals
make statements about worlds — about concrete scenarios — then those
worlds must be governed by the same laws that govern our world. But I
don’t think that counter-factuals make statements about worlds.
Consider the counter-factual :
(24) If Kennedy had not been assassinated, then Kennedy would have
been President until ’68.
It cannot be denied that if (24) says something about what happens
in some other world w, then w must be governed by the same laws
that govern our world. If the laws in w are sufficiently different, or even
minimally different, then Khrushchev might be President in w between
’63 and ’68.
But I myself do not think that counter-factuals are to be analyzed in
terms of the occurrences in other worlds or scenarios. On my view, no
alternative worlds are required. Other worlds, and the laws that govern
them, drop out as irrelevant. On my analysis, (24) is simply a probabi-
lity statement whose antecedent consists of the propositions one knows
to be true, minus the proposition Kennedy was assassinated, and whose
consequent is another proposition. Further, as we saw earlier, the ante-
cedent ultimately doesn’t include any statements of law.
So I don’t hold that counter-factuals are to be analyzed in terms of
the concept of law. We thus break the circle which leads from my view
to idealism about laws.
XIII. Why Humean laws support counter-factuals
I would like to end this paper by arguing against a point whose
correctness has been taken for granted.
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Hume’s theory of causation has been heavily criticized. One of the
more striking criticisms is this :
Humean laws are not ties between states of affairs. They
are just regularities. Therefore Humean laws don’t support
counter-factuals.
What is the case doesn’t tell us anything about what would
be the case unless what is the case includes forces or ties that
guarantee certain outcomes, given certain initial conditions.
If Hume is right, there are no such ties. What is the case
is confined to the events that occur : there is nothing be-
neath them that guarantee anything. So Humean laws don’t
support counter-factuals (See [Mackie 1973, 65]).
I agree that if counter-factuals make statements about other worlds,
then Humean laws do not support counter-factuals. If laws are Humean,
there is nothing underneath events : there are just the events. And the
occurrences in other worlds, if there are such things, are at least as likely
to falsify our counter-factuals as they are to validate them.
But, of course, I don’t think that counter-factuals make statements
about other worlds. A counter-factual says simply that one statement
probabilifies another. So
(25) if the vase had been dropped from a fifty story building, and
nothing blocked or retarded its fall, then it would have shattered
means :
(26) the proposition the vase was dropped from a fifty story building
and nothing retarded its fall, conjoined with P1 . . . Pn, probabilifies the
proposition the vase shattered,
where P1 . . . Pn are the propositions one knows to be true, minus the
proposition the vase was not dropped from a fifty story building. There is
no doubt that (26) is a correct probability-statement. And it is a correct
probability statement regardless of whether Hume is right about laws or
not. So Hume’s analysis of law is consistent with the fact that (25) is a
true counter-factual22.
22I do think that the Humean analysis is wrong. But, to my knowledge, my reasons
for thinking this have yet to be mentioned in the literature. Hume says that laws
are regularities involving certain kinds of states of affairs. But this presupposes that
the notion of a state of affairs is a non-causal one. For obviously if states of affairs
are themselves causal processes, then Hume’s analysis becomes viciously circular.
Causation is a regular concomitance of states of affairs. And states of affairs are
causal processes.
So clearly Hume is supposing that states of affairs, and objects, are not causal
processes. But this supposition is wrong, even incoherent. It seems to me part of
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